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Abstract
In the standard minority game, each agent in the minority group receives the same payoff
regardless of the size of the minority group.  Of great interest for real social and
biological systems are cases in which the payoffs to members of the minority group
depend on the size of the minority group.  This latter includes the fixed sum game.  We
find, remarkably, that the phase structure and general scaling behavior of the standard
minority game persists when the payoff function depends on the size of the minority
group.  There is still a phase transition at the same value of z, the ratio of the dimension
of the strategy space to the number of agents playing the game.  We explain the
persistence of the phase structure and argue that it is due to the absence of temporal
cooperation in the dynamics of the minority game.  We also discuss the behavior of
average agent wealth and the wealth distribution in these variable payoff games.
v. 2.01
2I. Introduction
The minority game is a game played with heterogeneous agents which seeks to model a
situation in which agents adaptively compete for a scarce resource.1  In the simplest
version of this model, each agent, at each time step of the game joins one of two groups,
labeled 0 and 1.  Each agent in the minority group is rewarded with a point, while each
agent in the majority group gets nothing.  An agent makes his decision about which group
to join by using one of several strategies in his strategy set.  The strategies use as input a
set of common information.  This model has a most remarkable structure:2,3 Most
notably, the system has a phase transition as a function of the ratio of the amount of
information used the by the agents’ strategies to the number of agents playing the game.
At the phase transition the system also evidences an emergent coordination among the
agents’ choices which leads to an optimum utilization of the scarce resource, in a well-
defined sense.  This transition is remarkably robust, and persists even when the nature of
the information used by the agents changes,4 when the information becomes exogenous
rather than endogenous,5 and when the agents’ strategies are allowed to evolve over
time.6
In most studies of the minority game, the payoff to the agents is very simple, namely,
each agent that is in the minority group is awarded one point, and each agent that is in the
majority group is awarded nothing.  In this paper we will consider an important
modification to the game.  We will study games with various payoffs to the agents (and
attendant modifications of the rankings of the agents’ strategies).  In real social and
biological systems, there may be various kinds of rewards for being in the minority, or
for being innovative.  It is easy to imagine situations in which the members of the
minority group share a fixed amount of resource (a fixed-sum game):  For example, a
number of baboons exploring a seldom-traveled part of the forest, find a tree with some
fruit.  The amount of fruit discovered is fixed, so that the smaller the group, the more fruit
there is for each member.  Note that in this story, there would be no payoff at all if the
baboons were not a minority, since the tree is in a “seldom-traveled” part of the forest.  It
is furthermore not difficult to generate scenarios in which total resources available to a
minority group increase or decrease in various ways as the size of the minority group
decreases, resulting in payoffs to members of a minority group that depend, in various
ways on the size of the minority group.  For example, a prospector may find a particularly
rich mine (heretofore unknown), but his ability to mine the ore will be very limited unless
he enlists the aid of partners.  Working together they may be able to mine more per miner
3than each one could separately.  This example also indicates that the issue of variable
payoffs in the minority game is associated with the more general question of cooperation
versus competition at different levels of organization.  In the case of the miner,
cooperation with his mining partners accounts for the increasing payoff with increasing
size of the minority group, while competition with other miners in the discovery of the
mine leads to the possibility of any payoff in the first place.
Aside from their interest for specific social and biological systems, minority games with
different payoff functions are interesting from the point of view of the fundamental
dynamics of emergent cooperation.  In this context, games in which an individual’s
payoff increases as the size of the minority group decreases are particularly interesting.
Studies of the minority game, heretofore, have shown that the dynamics of the game
leads to situations in which the size of the minority group is maximized, so that, in some
sense, social utility is maximized.  This was most clearly demonstrated when evolution
was added to the game.  If one imposes payoffs that explicitly favor the formation of
small minority groups, it is not a priori clear how the dynamics will proceed, or whether
the phase transition will persist.
In the next section we will briefly review the minority game and describe the
modifications to it that we shall study.  In Section III we shall present our results,
including results on overall resource utilization, as well as results on agent wealth and the
wealth distribution among agents.  We will find, surprisingly, that even with payoff
functions that favor the formation of small minority groups, the fundamental phase
structure of the game as a function of the amount of information available to the agents is
unchanged:  There is still a phase transition at the same critical parameter value as in the
standard minority game, and at that transition the size of minority groups are maximized.
Other measures of utility such as mean agent wealth and the wealth distribution among
agents vary in an understandable way.   The paper ends with a summary and discussion in
Section IV.
II. Description of the Game and its Modifications
A. General Features of the Standard Minority Game
The minority game is a simple competitive game.  The rules of the game are as follows:
At each time step of the game, each of N agents playing the game joins one of two
groups, labeled 0 or 1.  Each agent that is in the minority group at that time step gains
some reward, while each agent belonging to the majority group gets nothing.  In the
4commonly studied version of the game, the reward for each agent in the minority group is
fixed at one point, independent of the size of the minority group.  An agent chooses
which group to join at a given time step based on the prediction of a strategy.  A strategy
is a look-up table which returns a prediction of which group will be the minority group
during the current time step of the game, given the value of a piece of data.  In general,
different agents use different strategies, but the data used by the strategies is commonly
available to all the agents.  That is, at each point in the game, each agent receives the
same information (signal), and his strategies respond to that signal with a prediction.  In
the original game, the signals given to the agents are the list of m 0’s and 1’s that denote
which were the minority groups for the past m time steps.  Thus, a strategy of memory m
is a look-up table of 2m rows and 2 columns.  The left column contains all 2m
combinations of m 0's and 1's, and each entry in the right column is a 0 or a 1.  To use a
strategy of memory m, an agent observes which were the minority groups during the last
m time steps of the game and finds that entry in the left column of the strategy.  The
corresponding entry in the right column contains that strategy's prediction of which group
(0 or 1) will be the minority group during the current time step.  In this version of the
game, the strategies use (the publicly available) information from the historical record of
which group was the minority group as a function of time.  Other versions of the game
have been studied, including the interesting case in which the signals provided to the
agents are exogenous IID integers between 0 and 2m-1.5  The gross phase structure of the
system is the same in these cases.  In all cases, the controlling variable is z≡D/N, where D
is the dimension of the strategy space from which the agents draw their strategies.  (I.e.,
D is the number of different values that the publicly available signal can take on.)  In the
case in which the agents are given the m-history of the minority groups, D=2m.  In Fig. 1
we present a graph which shows how the system behaves as a function of z.  The vertical
axis is σ2/N, where σ is the standard deviation of the number of agents belonging to (say)
group 1.  A small value of σ means that the minority groups are typically large, so that
the scarce resource (membership in the minority group) is used near its limiting value.  It
is clear that as a function of z, the best resource utilization occurs at z=zc≈0.35, which is
also the point at which the system evidences a phase change.  Note also the remarkable
scaling properties of these results.2,3
B.  The Minority Game with Variable Payoffs
The robustness of the general phase structure of the minority game is remarkable.  But
the payoff structure of the standard minority game is neutral with respect to the size of
the minority group.  It is not clear whether the same structure will obtain if the payoff
5functions are changed.  In particular, it is not clear what the nature of the phase structure
will be if the payoff structure to individuals does not favor the formation of large
minority groups.  In a fixed sum game, or in a game in which individual payoffs increase
more rapidly as the size of the minority group decreases, we might expect qualitative
changes in the phase structure of the system.
To address this question, we will study games in which we alter both the payoff to the
agents, as well as the way in which the strategies are ranked.  For simplicity, we will
consider games in which the information used by the strategies is, as in the standard
game, the list of which were the minority groups for the past m time steps.  In the games
we shall discuss, all strategies used by all the agents have the same value of m.  At the
beginning of the game each agent is randomly assigned s (generally greater than one) of
the 22
m
 possible strategies of memory m, with replacement.  For his current play the agent
chooses from among his strategies the one that currently has the highest rank.  In the
original version of the model, a strategy is awarded one point for every time step in the
past in which that strategy would have predicted the correct minority group.7  In the cases
we shall consider, the payoffs will generally depend on the size of the minority group.
So, a strategy that would have successfully predicted the minority group at a given time
step will be rewarded by an amount equal to the payoff given to each of the agents in the
minority group at that time step.8  Following each round of decisions, the cumulative
performance of each of the agent's strategies is updated by comparing each strategy's
latest prediction with the current minority group.  Because each agent has more than one
strategy, the game is adaptive in that agents can choose to play different strategies at
different moments of the game in response to changes in their environment; that is, in
response to new entries in the time series of minority groups as the game proceeds.
Although this system is adaptive, the versions we analyze here are not, strictly speaking,
evolutionary.  The strategies do not evolve during the game, and the agents play with the
same s strategies they were assigned at the beginning of the game.
To cover a range of possibilities, we shall consider both power law and exponential
payoff functions.  Let n be the population of the minority group, and let r=n/N.  Then, we
consider payoff functions of the form A(r) ~ r-α, and A(r) ~ e-γr.  Here A(r) is the award
made to each member of the minority group9 when the minority group has a population,
n=rN.  The special case α=1 is the fixed sum game, while the limits α→0 or γ→0 recover
the standard minority game.  In addition to examining the behavior of overall resource
utilization, σ, we will also study the wealth distribution among agents by looking at mean
6agent wealth and measures of the width of the wealth distribution.  We choose to let A
depend on r rather than on n since the results have a nicer scaling behavior, as we shall
explain below.  It is obvious that the results of games in which A depends explicitly on n
can be obtained from our results by a simple rescaling of overall normalization or of γ.
III. Results
Each of the simulations reported in this paper were run for 10,000 time steps.  Values of
N used were 51, 101, and 201 agents, and eight realizations of each experiment were
preformed. To begin, we present, in Fig. 2a-e, σ2/N as a function of z=2m/N for several
different games with different pay-off functions.  Fig. 2a is the result for the game with
exponential payoff and γ=4.0, thus strongly favoring the formation of small minority
groups.  Fig. 2b is the result for the game with power law payoff and α=2, also favoring
small minority groups, and in particular, very strongly favoring the formation of very
small minority groups.  Fig. 2c shows the result for the fixed sum game, A(r)=r--1.  Figs.
2d and 2e show the result for games which weakly and strongly favor formation of large
minority groups, namely, A(r)=r2 and A(r)=e0.1r, respectively.  In all these graphs we see
the same general behavior of σ2/N as a function of z that we saw in the standard minority
game, Fig. 1.  In particular, as in the standard game, all results appear to fall on the same
universal scaling curve, and there appears to be a phase change in the system at the same
value of z as in the standard game.  At the phase transition we have the best overall
resource utilization in the sense that the typical minority group is largest.  Note also the
remarkable fact that the actual values of σ2/N do not seem to depend on the form of the
payoff in these graphs.  The only exception to this is that σ2/N in the standard game is
somewhat lower for small enough z than in the games with other payoff functions.  We
shall explain this effect below.  This same picture obtains for games with more than 2
strategies per agent.  Here also, the general behavior of σ2/N as a function of z does not
materially depend on A(r).
To check further that the nature of system and its phase change is as in the standard
minority game, we have also computed the conditional probabilities P(1| um), which are
the probabilities to have the minority group be group 1 following some specific string,
um, of m minority groups, in the game played with memory m.  As in the standard game,
we find that for z<zc the histogram of P(1| um) is flat at 0.5 for all um, while for z≥zc it is
not flat.  This verifies that the phase transition in the games with different A(r) is of the
same type as in the standard minority game, and may be thought of as a transition from
an informationally strategy-efficient phase to a strategy-inefficient phase.2,3
7In Figs. 3a-e, we plot w , the mean wealth of the agents, as a function of z for the five
cases studied in Figs. 2a-e.  For comparison, we plot in Figs. 3f w  for the standard
minority game.  In each of these figures we present results for several different values of
N.  We see some N dependence in most of the figures (with the exception of Fig. 3c,
which is the fixed sum game, and for which the curve is flat and N independent by
construction).  It does seem that, as N increases, w as a function of z may be approaching
a fixed curve.  That is particularly apparent for z>zc.  It also appears that w is a minimum
in Figs. 3a and 3b, and a maximum in Figs. 3d-f, even for large N.  This is what we
expect, since the minority groups are largest at z=zc.  However, an asymptotic curve
which is flat, at least for z≥zc cannot be ruled out.10  The general shapes of the curves in
Fig. 3 are easy to explain.  The average agent wealth should be on the order of the payoff
times the typical number of agents in the minority group.  The typical number of agents
in the minority group is closely related to σ, since the game is symmetric with respect to
interchange of group 0 and group 1.11  As a measure of the typical size of the minority
group, therefore, we take σ−≈
2
N
n .  Defining 
N
n
r =  we plot as solid lines in Figs. 3
the quantity )(rAr as a function of z.  We see that the curves match the simulation results
nicely.
Another important question to address is the wealth distribution among the agents.  There
are a number of different measures that can be used to characterize the extent to which
wealth is widely distributed among the agents, including the Gini coefficient, a measure
common in the social sciences.  Here we choose to look at η, the standard deviation of
the wealth distribution among the agents.  A small standard deviation means that the
wealth is relatively broadly distributed, while a large standard deviation means that the
wealth is concentrated in fewer agents.  In Figs. 4a-e we plot the quantity N
w
ηη ≡~  for
the games of Figs. 2 and 3.  We also plot, in Fig. 4f, η~ for the standard game.  First, note
that this quantity has a dip in the region near zc followed by a peak. The precise position
of the dip and subsequent peak is somewhat dependent on A(r).  Second, although these
curves appear to scale fairly well, we do not believe that there is a simple universal
scaling for η above and below the transition.  In the first place, it is easy to show that, in
the random choice game, (i.e. the game in which agents choose to join group 0 or group 1
independently and with equal probability), wη is independent of N for large N.  Indeed,
in all the games studied here, this quantity is independent of N for large z.  But wη   is
8not independent of N for other values of z.  To see this refer to Figs. 5, in which we plot
wη as a function of z for various N.  We have studied various possible scalings of wη
multiplied by different functions of N, and we have seen that a universal, z independent
scaling form does not exist.  Rather, it is possible, for a given payoff function A(r), to
find a function φA(N;z), such that );( zN
w
Aφη does become independent of N for large N.
It is also interested to note that for all those functions, A(r), that increase with decreasing
r (thus favoring the formation of small minority groups), the curve of η~  has a local
minimum at z=zc, while for those functions, A(r), which are not decreasing with
increasing r (including the standard minority game), the curve of η~ has a local minimum
at a value z>zc.
Changing the payoff function does not seem to materially affect the overall utilization of
resources, in the sense that the curve of σ2/N as a function of z is not substantially
different than in the standard minority game.  And while different payoff functions do
alter details of agent wealth such as the mean of wealth and the nature of its distribution
among agents, these changes are easily understandable, given the fact that σ2/N as a
function of z is not altered, as we shall explain in the next section.  To test further the
notion that changing the payoff to the agents does not change the fundamental phase
structure of the system, we have constructed an artificial payoff function that strongly
favors the formation of minority groups of a specific size.  In particular, we consider a
game played with N=101 agents and the payoff function A(r) = 1 for r ≠ ro, and 10 for
r=ro.  In Fig. 6 we plot σ2/N as a function of z for several different choices of ro
corresponding to favored minority groups of size no=49, 45 and 43.  Again, this curve is
substantially the same as in the standard minority game, and in particular, shows a
minimum and a phase change at z=zc.12
IV. Discussion of the Results
The most significant result of this paper is the observation that the behavior of σ2/N as a
function of z is not materially altered when the payoff function is changed. σ2/N still
shows the same remarkable scaling behavior and phase structure that it had in the
original, standard minority game.2 One might have supposed that the behavior of σ2/N
would have been strongly affected by varying A(r), and in particular, by allowing A(r) to
be large for small r.  Then, it should have been possible for agents to arrange their
choices so that an average agent would have been in the majority group well over 50% of
the time, but when in the minority group that minority group would be small.  In
9principle, this can lead to greater agent wealth (and high ranking for the appropriate
strategy) if the payoff for small minority groups is sufficiently high.  It is somewhat
surprising that this does not happen, and that the curve of σ2/N as a function of z is
largely unchanged (with the exception of very low z, an effect which we shall explain in
a moment).
One way to understand this, is to recognize that an agent’s choice about which group to
join is dictated by that strategy that has the highest rank.  For values of z not too far from
zc, (and following an initial learning period) most agents have one strategy which has a
very high rank, and is used most of the time. Recall that the rankings of the strategies are
cumulative over the course of the game, so such rankings represent average strategy
performance.13  Thus, the solution which the system discovers, and which results in large
minority groups regardless of A(r), is based on the average performance of the agents’
strategies.  However, in order for the system to take advantage of A(r)’s that strongly
favor small minority groups, requires temporal coordination.  That is, agents must
cooperate in the sense that agents must sacrifice themselves so that they place themselves
in the majority group most of the time, and in the minority group only seldom.  Given the
way in which strategies are evaluated, it is fairly clear that such temporally structured
solutions will not, in general, be found.  One might suppose that the low z regime of the
minority game contradicts this argument.  Here the minority groups are, on average,
relatively small.  Furthermore, if A(r) favors small minority groups, it is possible for
average agent wealth to exceed the value it has for larger z, as we see, for example, in
Fig. 3a.  However, the dynamics in this phase can hardly be said to be cooperative.
Indeed, those agents who are wealthy are precisely those agents whose (two) strategies
are most similar.14  An agent who has two strategies whose responses to a given string,
say um, are the same will be in the (small) minority group that follows um about half the
time.  An agent whose two strategies respond differently to that string, though, will
generally not be in the minority group following um.  The kind of temporal cooperation
necessary to take advantage of an A(r) that favors small minority groups is much closer
to the successful strategies used in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, and related games.15
There, players explicitly use the information that the game will continue in order to
develop strategies that are sub-optimal locally in time, but perform much better over
time.  The question of modifying the minority game to allow agents to develop
temporally coordinated strategies in order to generate mutually beneficial small minority
groups will be discussed elsewhere.
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In the context of a statistical mechanical description of the minority game, one might
suppose that A(r) is something like an irrelevant operator.  In ordinary statistical
mechanical systems, irrelevant operators do not affect the critical exponents at second
order phase transitions.  However, our numerical results suggest that much more of the
structure of the minority game is unaffected by changes in A(r), in particular, the shape of
the curve of σ2/N as a function of z and the value of zc.  In the context of a field theoretic
approach to statistical mechanics, A(r), therefore, appears to play the role of a total
derivative operator, the addition of which does not affect the dynamics of the system.  If
this is the case, then it should be possible to transform the minority game played with a
non-trivial A(r) into the standard minority game by a canonical transformation.16  On the
other hand, it is unlikely that the phase transition observed at z=zc is a simple second
order phase transition.  It is more likely that the minority game is analogous to a spin-
glass, and that the phase transition is analogous to that seen in spin-glass-like systems.17
One must be cognizant of this essential complication.  Of course, if the dynamics of the
minority game were generalized sufficiently to allow for the temporal coordination
described above, then A(r) would presumably cease to be a total derivative.
Although in general, the curve of σ2/N as a function of z is independent of A(r), there is a
deviation at small z for the standard game:  In the standard game in which each strategy
is awarded one point whenever it would have predicted the correct minority group, σ2/N
is less than for other choices of A(r) for low enough z.  This anomalous result is easy to
understand.  As described in detail elsewhere,3 for small enough z, the dynamics of the
minority game can be well approximated by considering the response of the system to
each m-string of minority groups as independent.  As a consequence, for low enough z,
the game is dominated by a period-two dynamics in which even occurrences of a given
m-string of minority groups, um, give rise to the opposite minority group than occurred
following the preceding odd occurrence of the same string, um.  In the standard minority
game, after each pair (odd-even) of occurrences of a given string, um, two strategies
belonging to a given agent, but which have different predictions in response to um will be
tied in their ranking.  Thus, at the next odd occurrence of um such an agent will choose
randomly between these two strategies, and the resulting size of the minority group will
be close to 50% of the agents, within random fluctuations.  On the other hand, even
occurrences of um will typically give rise to very small minority groups.3  For other
functions, A(r), rewards to the strategies depend on the size of the minority group.  They
are real numbers, not integers, and so ties in ranking between strategies will almost never
occur.  Thus, the minority group following a given string, um, will simply alternate
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between 0 and 1,18 and the minority groups will all be small (on the order of the size of
the minority groups following an odd occurrence of um in the standard game).
Consequently, the average size of the minority group is anomalously large in the standard
game, and so σ2/N is anomalously small in the standard game, for small enough z.
Although σ2/N is largely independent of A(r) and scales with N, other derivative
properties of the system such as average agent wealth and the wealth distribution do
depend on A(r), and do not scale with N in a very simple way.  In the last section, we
showed that average agent wealth as a function of z was easily understandable in terms of
r .  For those games in which A(r) favors small minority groups strongly enough19,
average agent wealth is maximal at zc, while for those game in which A(r) increases with
large minority groups, average agent wealth is smallest at zc.  It is also noteworthy that
the wealth distribution has a local minimum near zc.  Although the wealth distribution is
smaller for very large z, agent wealth is also considerably smaller there, so most agents
may be said to be “equally poor”, which is not surprising for values of z for which
average dynamics is similar to the random choice game.  But for those payoff functions
which do not decrease with decreasing size of the minority group, there is some sense in
which system-wide utility is maximized near zc:  Agents are on average wealthy, and the
wealth is distributed relatively widely in the population.  On the other hand, it is
interesting that for somewhat larger values of z the situation is rather different, and there
is peak in the wealth distribution curve so that agents may still be somewhat wealthy, on
average, but the wealth is distributed less uniformly.  We believe that this curve actually
reflects a cross-over between the two different dynamics that obtain above and below zc,
although the detailed nature of the cross-over is not entirely clear to us.
In the last section, we also noted that there was significant N dependence in w  and η  at
fixed z.  Consider, for example, the low z results of mean wealth in Fig. 3.  Here we see
that if A(r) favors small minority groups, mean wealth is larger for smaller values of N at
the same z, whereas if A(r) favors large minority groups, mean wealth is smaller for
smaller N at the same (low) value of z.  These results can be traced to the fact that there is
a finite size effect at low z, which results in average minority groups that are somewhat
smaller for finite N, and, for fixed z, approach their asymptotic limit from below.  This
effect, to first order was explicitly calculated for the standard game at low z in Ref. 3.
Although the detailed dynamics for arbitrary A(r) are somewhat different, the origin of
the effect is still the same.  Similar reasoning can be used to explain the other finite size
effects in the mean wealth and the wealth distribution.
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V. Conclusion and Summary
In this paper we have shown that the main results of the minority game, in particular,
σ2/N as a function of z, is materially independent of the payoff function to the agents.
The system continues to have a phase transition at the same value of z, and the two
phases have the same characteristics.  We also discussed the behavior of average agent
wealth and the wealth distribution, and showed that those functions were understandable
given the payoff function and the fact that σ2/N as a function of z is materially the same
as in the standard game.  Finally, we discussed what we believe to be the fundamental
dynamical reason for the persistence of this result, namely, the absence of nontrivial
temporal cooperation among the agents.
Our results provide another important piece of information that points to the surprising
robustness and universality of the phase structure of minority dynamics, at least for those
systems in which there is an absence of temporal cooperation.  And because different
social and biological systems manifest different payoffs, our results strongly suggest the
relevance of these dynamics to a wide range of complex adaptive systems.  Indeed, in
very simplified terms, different payoff functions, A(r), can arise from different detailed
cooperative dynamics within groups.  Thus, these games can be considered to be very
simple models that capture some of the consequences of cooperation within groups.
Understanding, in more detail, how minority dynamics manifests itself in specific social
and biological systems is likely to lead to a deeper understanding, not only of those
specific systems, but of the structure of complex adaptive systems in general.
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 This argument holds even if the strategy rankings are determined by credit that is discounted far into the
past.  See Ref. 3 for more details.
14
 For a detailed discussion of the dynamics of this phase, see Ref. 3.
15
 See, for example, R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, (Basic Books, 1985).
16
 One of us (RS) thanks R. Akhoury for enlightening discussions on this point.
17
 This possibility was first suggested in Ref. 2.  The work cited in Ref. 7, by M. Marsili, et al. has explored
this possibility further.
18
 An exception to this occurs if A(r) is chosen to strongly favor large minority groups.  In that case, it will
sometimes happen that the minority group (say, 0) that follows some occurrence of um will be small, and,
since A(r) favors large minority groups, strategies that predict 0 following um will be assigned only small
credit for correctly predicting 0.  Thus, the strategies that predict 1 in response to um will continue to
dominate, and the next minority group will also be 0, but will be larger (closer to 50% of the agents).
14
                                                                                                                                           
Despite this complication, A(r)’s that favor large minority groups still seem to give the same value of σ2/N
as the other (non-normal) games.
19
 The relevant quantity here is, of course, the behavior of ∫ )()( rdrrA µ .
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Figure Captions
Fig. 1. σ2/N as a function of z=2m/N for standard minority game.  Each point represents
an average value over 32 runs of 10,000 time steps apiece. Triangles indicate the results
of games played with N=51 agents, squares correspond to N=101 agents, and circles
indicate the results of games played with N=201 agents.
Figs. 2a-e. σ2/N as a function of z=2m/N for several different games with different pay-
off functions. Each point represents an average over 8 runs of 10,000 time steps apiece.
In all these figures, triangles indicate the results of games played with N=51 agents,
squares correspond to N=101 agents, and circles indicate the results of games played with
N=201 agents.   2a) A(r) = e-4r,  2b) A(r) = r-2, 2c) A(r)=r-1 (fixed sum game), 2d) A(r)=r2,
2e) A(r)=e0.1r.
Figs. 3a-f.  Mean wealth of the agents, w , as a function of z for the games studied in
Figs. 2 (Figs. 3a-e), and for the standard minority game (Fig. 3f).  Each point represents
an average over 8 runs of 10,000 time steps apiece.  In all these figures, triangles indicate
the results of games played with N=51 agents, squares correspond to N=101 agents, and
circles indicate the results of games played with N=201 agents. The solid lines in these
graphs are simple analytic estimates of the mean wealth, as described in Section IV. 3a)
A(r) = e-4r, 3b) A(r) = r-2, 3c) A(r)=r-1 (fixed sum game), 3d) A(r)=r2, 3e) A(r)=e0.1r, 3f)
A(r) is that of the standard minority game.
Figs. 4a-e. Scaled standard deviation of agent wealth, N
w
ηη ≡~ , as a function of z for
the games studied in Figs. 2 (Figs. 4a-e), and for the standard minority game (Fig. 4f).
Because in these figures we plot results for large values of m (up to m=16), each game
was run for 50,000 time steps.  Each point represents an average over 8 such runs.  In all
these figures, triangles indicate the results of games played with N=51 agents, squares
correspond to N=101 agents, and circles indicate the results of games played with N=201
agents.  4a) A(r) = e-4r,  4b) A(r) = r-2, 4c) A(r)=r-1 (fixed sum game), 4d) A(r)=r2, 4e)
A(r)=e0.1r, 4f) A(r) is that of the standard minority game.
 Figs. 5a-e. Scaled standard deviation of agent wealth, wη , as a function of z for the
games studied in Figs. 2 (Figs. 5a-e), and for the standard minority game (Fig. 5f).  In all
these figures, triangles indicate the results of games played with N=51 agents, squares
16
correspond to N=101 agents, and circles indicate the results of games played with N=201
agents. 5a) A(r) = e-4r,  5b) A(r) = r-2, 5c) A(r)=r-1 (fixed sum game), 5d) A(r)=r2, 5e)
A(r)=e0.1r, 5f) A(r) is that of the standard minority game.
Fig. 6. σ2/N as a function of z for the payoff function A(r) = 10 for r = ro ≡ no/N, and A(r)
= 1, otherwise with different choices of ro corresponding to favored minority groups of
various sizes.  In all these experiments, N=101. Each point represents an average value
over 32 runs of 10,000 time steps apiece.  Triangles indicate no=49, squares indicate no =
45 and circles indicate no = 43.
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